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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
person who was prudent and far-sighted enough to establish an
insurance fund and yet allow credit for one who does not provide
such a fund and yet happens fortuitously to have some cash on
hand at the time of the injury with which he pays for all or part
of the plaintiff's medical expenses? Also, might not this multiple
payment of the same expenses indirectly contribute to increasing
insurance costs to be borne by the general insurance premium-
paying public? A simple solution (and one which would avoid
the clearly erroneous application of the Collateral Source Rule by
those courts which allow recovery under both clauses) would be an
insertion of a specific exclusion in the automobile liability policy.
This exclusion could be worded to the effect that any amount pay-
able under the liability coverage should be reduced to the extent
of any payments made under the medical payments coverage.
It is clear that if an insurer inserts an exclusion of this type into the
family automobile insurance policy, it would be upheld by the
courts in order to prevent a double recovery.40
RICHARD N. JEFFRIES
INSURANCE-AVIATION EXCLUSION CLAUSE-WAR AS AN INTER-
VENING FORCE-Hostile ground fire struck the insured, a United
States Marine Corps helicopter co-pilot, while he was on a flight
over Vietnam. The helicopter returned safely to the base, where
the insured died the next day.
The decedent was insured with the defendant, the life insurance
policy providing in part:
"This policy is issued under the express condition that
should the death of the Insured occur as a result of operating
or riding in, or descending from, any kind of aircraft if
the Insured is a pilot, officer or member of the crew of such
aircraft . . . the Company's liability shall be limited . . ."
to a sum less than the face amount of the policy to be
computed in accordance with the formula set forth therein."'
On suit by the policy beneficiary for the proceeds, the defend-
ant contended that death resulted from operating or riding in an
aircraft, within the scope of the exclusionary language, thus pre-
cluding recovery of the full face amount of the policy. The United
States District Court (Eastern District of Virginia) disagreed, con-
40. Gunter v. Lord, 242 La. 943, 140 So.2d 11 (1962) ; Bowers v. Hardware Mut. Cas.
Co., 119 So.2d 671 (La. Ct. App. 1960).
1. Mann v. Service Life Insurance Co,, 284 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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struing the exclusion provision as not intending to limit payments in
cases where death results from an intervening cause totally unre-
lated to the operation of the aircraft. Mann v. Service Life Insurance
Co., 284 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Va. 1968).
There are two distinct approaches to the issue of whether the
insured's death in this type of case falls within the aviation exclu-
sion clause of his life insurance policy. The intervening cause ap-
proach looks to whether or not there was an independent interven-
ing force which disrupted the normal activity of flight to cause
death. If such force does in fact exist, the exclusion clause means
nothing, and the insured can recover. Under the direct-indirect re-
sult approach, if the insured's death occurs as a direct or even
indirect result of aviation, the aviation exclusion clause will be ap-
plied to deny recovery.
The basis for the decision in the instant case is that the deced-
ent's death was caused by an intervening force. Generally, an in-
surer is allowed to exclude those specific risks it declines to in-
sure. The specific risks excluded by the insurance policy in the
present case were those risks ordinarily associated with aeronau-
tics. The District Court considered the enemy bullets as an inde-
pendent intervening force, and not an ordinary risk of aviation ex-
cluded by the policy.2
The earliest decision on aviation exclusions in a military situa-
tion was Woodmen of the World v. Compton, which lends support
to the case in discussion. In that case the insured was drafted into
the army, assigned to the air forces, and was killed while flying.
The Arkansas Supreme Court allowed recovery on the ground that
the exclusion clause referred only to civilian aviation. It should be
noted that there was no mention of military aviation in the insur-
ance policy clause. The court in the instant case pursued this ar-
gument to its logical conclusion, noting that, if desired, the insurer
could have inserted a war risk exclusion in the policy.4 The effect
of the Compton decision has been the incorporation of the dual ex-
clusions (civilian and military aviation hazards) in one exclusion
clause in most insurance policies.5
Primary support for the plaintiff's position came from Bull v.
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada.6 Lieutenant Bull was a crew
member of an army plane which landed safely in the South Pa-
cific after losing an engine in an aerial encounter with Japanese
2. Id. at 140.
3. 140 Ark. 313, 215 S.W. 672, 674 (1919); accord, Paradies v. Travelers Ins. Co., 183
Misc. 887, 52 N.Y.S.2d 290 (N.Y. City Ct. 1944)
4. Mann v. Service Life Insurance Co., 284 F. Supp. 139, 140 (E.D. Va. 1968).
5. Note, Judicial Interpretation of Aviation Risks Exclusion Clauses, 25 NoTRE DAME
LAWYER 695, 705 (1949).
6. 141 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1944).
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planes. While the insured was standing on the wing of the plane
attempting to launch a life raft, a Japanese Zero strafed the
fallen plane, causing Lt. Bull's death. Bull's insurance policy pro-
vided:
Death as a result, directly or indirectly, of service, travel,
or flight in any species of aircraft, as a passenger or other
wise, is a risk not assumed under this policy. 7
According to the court, death was due to a war risk and was
not excluded by the policy. The court placed emphasis on the plane's
landing prior to the death, indicating that the insured's relation to
the flight had ended immediately upon landing.8 The court seemed
to suggest that although Bull would not have been in this predica-
ment but for his aerial flight, he was divorced from aerial activ-
ities once the flight was discontinued. This is an artificial distinction
used to rationalize a result approved by public policy, and was re-
futed in an earlier case.9
The argument of the dissent, that Bull's death resulted indi-
rectly from flight though the immediate and proximate cause was
the Japanese attack, appears to be equally logical. 10
A 1948 SOuth Dakota case 1 supports the intervening cause ap-
proach utilized by the instant court, that enemy gunfire intervenes
to sever the causal chain initiated by the flight. In this case a
radioman-gunner on a military plane was killed when his plane
crashed in the Pacific. According to the court, the enemy gunfire
which led to the plane's crash was not one of the risks ordinarily
associated with aeronautics. 12
Analogous to the above situation is a hypothetical example where
death is excluded from coverage if due to riding in an automobile,
and the insured is killed by gunfire while driving the car.8 Clearly,
had the victim not gone for a drive he would still be alive. But it
would certainly seem that the proximate cause of death, not to men-
tion the actual cause, was the bullet.
The direct-indirect result approach, referred to by the defend-
ant insurance company in the instant case, does not consider a
third party, or an act unrelated to aviation, as an intervening force
which would disrupt the causative chain. In the Neel case 4 the
7. Id. at 457.
8. Id. at 458.
9. Pittman v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 17 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1927).
10. Bull v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 141 F.2d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 1944).
11. Temmy v. Phoenix Mutual Life, 72 S.D. 387, 34 N.W.2d 833 (1949).
12. Id. at 391, 34 N.W.2d at 835; accord, Onze V. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1955
U.S. & Can. Av. 333 (Lackawanna Co. C.P. 1954) ; Boye v. United Services Life Ins. Co.,
168 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ; Riche v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 84 N.Y.S.2d 832
(Cayuga Co. Ct. 1948).
13. Boye v. United Services Life Ins. Co., 168 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir 1948).
14, Neel v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 131 F.2d 159 (2d. Cir. 1942).
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court noted that, although the insured did not die in the plane
crash, it would be unnatural to say that death did not result from
participation in aeronautics.
If he landed in the open sea, even though without immediate
injury, drowning was an almost inevitable consequence.
To say that his death did not result "from participation in
aeronautics" would exclude from the proviso of the policy
the most ordinary risks involved. .... 15
The application of this theory to the present case would pre-
sumably result in a decision regarding the enemy gunfire as not
interrupting the causative chain, thus relieving the insurer of li-
ability for death due to a foreseeable risk of aviation.
Order of United Commercial Travelers v. King16 supports the
insurance company's view in the case in discussion, and probably
best stresses the idea that where an insured makes a safe landing
and later meets his death, an aviation exclusion clause is effective
in barring recovery from the insurer.1 7 The insured in King, a flight
observer with the Civil Air Patrol, was forced to ditch his plane in
the ocean. He was seen alive in a raft at noon, but two hours later
was found dead. The aviation clause in King's insurance policy
excluded "[D]eath resulting from participation, as a passenger or
otherwise, in aviation or aeronautics ..... ,,18 Reversing the award
of the trial court, the Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) noted that
death resulted from drowning and exposure and was a risk asso-
ciated with flight over water; a risk equivalent to the uncertainly
of gravity encountered in normal flight.19
The court in King noted the war hazard in Bull as a distinguish-
ing feature, and suggested that in Bull death could have been due
to an intervening force, i.e., the enemy strafing.2 0
Basically, what the Court of Appeals did in King was to reject
the lower court's use of the intervening cause approach and replace
it with the theory of direct-indirect result. It would seem strange to
say that death after falling from an airplane is not a result of par-
ticipation in aviation, but this implication was repudiated by the
decision. Since the appellate court did differentiate the war hazard
in Bull as a probable intervening force, the court's decision under
facts similar to those of the present case would be conjectural,
but would probably be in discord with that reached in the present
case.
15. Id. at 160.
16. 161 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1947).
17. Note, Judicial Interpretation of Aviation Risk Exclusion Clauses, 25 NOTRE DAME
IAWYER 695, 708 (1949).
18. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. King, 161 F.2d 108, 109 (4th Cir. 1947).
19. Ia.
20. Id. at 110.
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One of the few military cases following the direct-indirect result
approach is where a bomber pilot on a run over Germany was
struck by anti-aircraft fire and subsequently died, even though the
plane was not damaged.21 Denying recovery on the insurance pol-
icy, the Pennsylvania court stated that the death resulted from a
foreseeable effect of such a flight. "Death was suffered in the
course of an actual aerial flight due to a cause not entirely or
wholly unconnected with the flight as suggested by the plaintiff, but
due to a cause provoked by this flight."' 22
If presented with the instant facts, the Thoma court would prob-
ably consider the enemy bullets a foreseeable risk under the cir-
cumstances of the war, a risk excluded by the policy. This seems
to indicate that where the cause of death can realistically be traced
to the flight, the resultant death can accurately be termed a direct
or indirect result of flight.
The solo pilot in Neel v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York 21
was found drowned in the ocean some distance from his floating
plane. Noting that death would not have occured had the insured
not taken the flight, the court held that death was caused by par-
ticipation in aeronautics. 24
The Neel court gives no support to the argument of Bull that
once the plane touched down participation in aeronautics ended.
Aeronautical activities " . . . [D]o not end or begin with the actual
flight, but include his presence or movements in or near to the
machine incidental to beginning or concluding the trip. ' 25
Tennefos v. Guarantee Mutual Life Co. 26 is the most recent
North Dakota case on this subject, and suggests a view comparable
with that presented by King and the minority of the instant case.
Here the insured died in the crash of the private plane he was op-
erating. The life insurance policy provided for double indemnity in
case of accidental death, if:
(4) . . . The death of the Insured did not result directly
or indirectly from . . . (c) travel or flight in, or descent from
any kind of aircraft operated for military or naval purposes,
• . . or of which the Insured is acting as pilot or member
of the crew ... 27
21. Thoma v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1947 U.S. Av. R. 625 (Northampton Co. C.P. Pa.
1946) ; See also Green v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., 144 F.2d 55 (1st. Cir. 1944) ;
Knouse v. Equitable Life Insurance Company of Iowa, 163 Kan. 213, 181 P.2d 310 (1947).
22. Thoma v. New York Life Ins. Co., 194,7 U.S. Av. R. 625 (Northampton Co. C.P. Pa.
1946), as cited in Onze v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1955 U.S. & Can. Av. 333 (Lack-
awanna Co. C.P. Pa. 1954)
23. 131 F.2d 159 (2d. Cir. 1942).
24. 14 at 161.
25. Pittman v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 17 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1927).
26. 136 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1965); See also Jordan v. Western States Life Ins. Co., 53
N.W.2d 860 (N.D. 1952), dictum.
27. Tennefos v. Guarantee Mutual Life Co., 136 N.W.2d 155, 156 (N.D. 1965).
538
RECENT CASES
The North Dakota Supreme Court echoed the trial court's find-
ing of unambiguity, citing two North Dakota statutes,2 8 and noted
that plaintiff was precluded from recovery since death resulted di-
rectly or indirectly from flight.
Although the facts of this North Dakota case are not exactly
synonomous with those of the instant case, the reasoning employed
is applicable to the instant situation. If the North Dakota court were
faced with the case in discussion, any inference as to their re-
sult would be sheer speculation, since Tennefos did not involve the
war hazard presented by the instant case.
The case under discussion presents an issue to which the dis-
similar theories of intervening cause and direct-indirect result have
been applied. The problem posed by this issue is not the conflict
of the two theories, but rather the conflicting facts to which each
has been applied.
Rational results have been reached under the intervening cause
approach when it has been applied to military causes involving a
risk of war. Clearly, a risk of war is not an every-day associate
of aviation, and the independent factor of enemy action should log-
ically be construed as an intervening force which breaks the chain
of causation begun by the flight. As the instant case noted in its
use of this approach, the insurer would be liable on the policy
unless he had specifically excluded that war risk.
Similarly logical decisions have been returned where the di-
rect-indirect result approach has been applied to strictly civilian
cases, or to military situations where no hazard of war is involved.
2 9
It would seem safe to assume that a plane crash is commonly
acquainted with aviation, this assumption being the probably rea-
son behind these exclusion clauses in the first place. The various
ways a plane may crash and death may result therefrom (forces
of nature, flying into mountains, running out of fuel, ditching in
the sea, etc.) must be considered usual risks of aviation, especially
to the flying public. Where death is due to one of these usual risks
of aviation, the death is undeniably a result of aviation, and thus
the insurer should be relieved of liability.
According to the above discussion, the present issue, whether
or not death resulted from a risk of aviation excluded by the policy,
28. N.D. CENT. CODE 9-07-02 (1959) ; "The language of a contract is to govern its inter-
pretation if the language is clear and explicit and does not involve an absurdity." N.D.
CENT. CODE 9-07-09 (1959) : "The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordi-
nariV and popular sense rather than according to their strict legal meaning, unless used by
the parties in a technical sense, or unless a special meaning is given to them by usage, in
which case the latter must be followed."
29., See Green v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., 144 F.2d 55 (1st. Cir. 1944) ; Neel
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 131 F.2d 159 (2d. Cir. 1942) Thoma v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 1947 U.S. Av. R. 625 (Northampton Co. C.P. Pa 1946) Knouse v. Equitable
Life Insurance Company of Iowa, 163 Kan. 213, 181 P.2d 310 (1947).
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is nearly cut and dried, depending on which approach is used by
the particular court. The problem created, however, is where the
intervening cause theory is applied to a situation with no war risk,
or where the direct-indirect result theory is applied to situations
featuring a war risk.30
As an alternative to two distinct approaches for two distinct
situations there should theoretically be available one "universal"
test, be it intervening cause or direct-indirect result, that could be ap-
plied to aviation cases in general, whether or not they include a
war risk. It is difficult for this writer to point to any suggested
or imagined theory as that "universal" test. Apparently, the courts
have not been able to do so either.
ROBERT KEOGH
30. Riqhe v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 84 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Cayuga Co. Sup. Ct. 1948) ;
The insured was a crew member of a United States bomber over Austria and was killed
by anti-aircraft fire. His life insurance policy did not cover "death as a result, directly or
indirectly, or travel or flight in any species of aircraft .... " The court held that the
death was not the result, directly or indirectly, of air flight, but was due to an act of war
by a third party (intervening cause test), and allowed Riche to recover from the insurer.
Compare Riohe with Thoma v. New York Life Ins., 194.7 U.S. Av. R. 625 (Northampton
Co. C.P. 1946); Here the insured was a bomber pilot over Germany and was killed by
anti-aircraft fire. The life insurance policy excluded "death as a result, directly or in-
directly, from operating or riding in any kind of aircraft." The court stated that death
resulted from a foreseeable risk of the flight, a risk not entirely unconnected with the
flight, but provoked by the flight (direct-indirect result test). Recovery here was denied.
